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It is well known that investor sentiment affects aggregate stock returns. We investigate the 
economic link between sport sentiment and US sectoral stock returns. We ﬁnd that sport 
sentiment affects only the ﬁnancial sector. We argue that this result might be explained 
by the high liquidity that makes the ﬁnancial sector more attractive to foreign investors 
who in turn are more prone to sport sentiment than local investors in the US. Accordingly, 
an arbitrageur can build a proﬁtable trading strategy by selling short the ﬁnancial sector 
during the FIFA World cup periods and buying it back afterwards. 
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 1. Introduction 
An increasing number of empirical works suggests that investor sentiment has strong effects on asset prices. In
these studies, different empirical measures of investor sentiment have been proposed. For instance, Saunders (1993) and
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) consider sentiment effects driven by meteorological conditions. Kamstra et al. (2003) ana-
lyze the implication of seasonal affective diseases on asset prices while Bollena et al. (2011) propose to measure sentiment
by using Twitter feeds. Edmans et al. (2007) , Palomino et al. (2009) , Kaplanski and Levy (2010a ), Kaplanski and Levy (2010b ),
Kaplanski and Levy (2012) and Kaplanski and Levy (2014) measure investor sentiment using soccer results. Brown and Cliff
(2004) , Brown and Cliff (2005) and Lux (2011) identify sentiment using survey measures. Cao and Wei (2005) investigate
the relation between stock market returns and temperature while Yuan et al. (2006) consider moon phases as a possible
determinant of investor sentiment and study their impact on asset prices. Da et al. (2015) build an index of investors’ fear
using internet search volume. ∗ Tel.: +49 69798 30096 
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 The empirical asset pricing literature typically studies the effect of different mood variables (i.e., variables capturing
meteorological conditions, seasonal diseases, sport outcomes, etc.) on aggregate stock returns. However, it is reasonable to
assume that different investors are prone to different kinds of sentiment. To the extent that different investors have different
preferences for stocks trading, we expect that a given mood variable captures a particular relationship between sentiment
and prices that is stronger for some stocks (or sectors) than others. In fact, Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that investors
“simply demand stocks that have the bundle of salient characteristics compatible with their sentiment”. 
Motivated by these observations we ask ourselves whether different US sectors are affected differently by investor sen-
timent. As a measure of investor sentiment we use results of World Cup games as in Kaplanski and Levy (2010a ). We ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant sentiment effect only for the ﬁnancial industry while other sectors do not react signiﬁcantly to changes in
the investors’ sport sentiment. To investigate the economic reasons behind this result we classify the US sectors according
to different measures of liquidity and we ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial sector is consistently one of the most (if not the most)
liquid sectors in our sample. To the extent that the sentiment effect is mainly induced by foreign investors, as suggested
by Kaplanski and Levy (2010a ), our ﬁnding is consistent with the observed preference of foreign investors for more liquid
stocks ( Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) ). Thus, one way to interpret our results in light of the argument of Baker and Wur-
gler (2006) is that foreign investors demand more ﬁnancial stocks because their salient characteristic (i.e., high liquidity) is
compatible with sport sentiment. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the background for our analysis; Section 3 describes
our econometric approach; Section 4 presents the results of our regression analysis; Section 5 illustrates a trading strategy
that exploits the effect of sport sentiment; Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and Motivation 
We seek to test the hypothesis that different sectors are affected differently by investor sentiment. Chen et al.
(2013) analyse the effect of optimism and pessimism on stock returns of 11 Asian countries during the period 1996-2010.
They ﬁnd that sectoral stock returns react in different ways to local sentiment (measured as turnover by volume in lo-
cal stock markets) and global sentiment (measured as turnover by volume in global stock markets). Similarly, Huang et al.
(2014) build proxies for investor pessimism and optimism and ﬁnd that optimism affects stock returns in most (but not all)
US industries while pessimism has no effect on sectoral stock returns. Uygur and Tas (2014) use weekly trading volume of
Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 as a proxy for investor sentiment and show that sentiment has a greater inﬂuence on industry,
banking, and food and beverage sectors than on other sectors in Turkey. Admittedly, this literature is still fragmented to
draw an educated conclusion. However, these results suggest that – despite investor sentiment being shown to affect the
behavior of the aggregate stock market – it is plausible that this effect originates from individual sectors and then spills
over to the entire market. 
3. Data and Methodology 
We employ Datastream Global Equity Indices (DGEI). In particular, we retrieve our ten sectoral stock indexes from level
2 of DGEI which divides the market into the following sectors: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Finan-
cials, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities. 4 Our sample covers 10,958 trading
days, from January 1973 to December 2014. 5 We compute continuously compounded day-to-day percentage returns and
summarize their descriptive statistics in Table 1 below. 
The empirical methodology is based on Kaplanski and Levy (2010a ). Our sample includes 11 FIFA World Cups, with a
total of 234 event effect days (EED) and 255 event period effect days (EPED) deﬁned as follows: EED accounts for match
days – which are also trading days – and the subsequent trading days; 6 EPED covers the whole World Cup period, beginning
on the day of the ﬁrst match and continuing until the ﬁrst day after the ﬁnal match. The break days before the ﬁnal game
plus two additional trading days are also included 7 . 
Our null hypothesis is thus that the US stock market – in each sector – is eﬃcient and does not allow for exploitable
arbitrage. The alternative hypothesis is that the World Cup effect – captured by EED and EPED – is statistically signiﬁcant.4 The use of DGEI represents a ubiquitous practice in empirical studies of international ﬁnancial markets focused mainly on sectors (see, among others, 
Baca et al. (20 0 0) , Griﬃn and Stulz (2001) , Brooks and Negro (2004) , Nandha and Faff (2008) , Donadelli and Paradiso (2014) and Donadelli and Persha 
(2014) ). 
5 Notice that our sample is consistent with the analysis carried out by Edmans et al. (2007) who collect international soccer results from January 1973 
through December 2004. 
6 This is based on Edmans et al. (2007) who suggest that the local effect of a soccer game occurs the day after the game ends. We also implement tests 
when only days after the games are considered as EED. Results are almost identical and available upon request. The day of the game is included for the 
following reason: depending on where the games are hosted, the US market may still be open when the game ends. For all those games played during the 
week-end we assume they could have an effect on Monday (or the ﬁrst available trading day). 
7 The data for the World Cup are taken from www.worldcup-history.com . 
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Table 1 
Sector Returns. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic BM CG CS F HC I OG T TC U 
Mean 0.0361 0.0317 0.0358 0.0387 0.04 4 4 0.0405 0.0427 0.0355 0.0354 0.0374 
Med 0.0158 0.017 0.0295 0.0234 0.0311 0.0203 0.0209 0.0208 0.0241 0.0356 
Max 14.506 9.031 10.979 13.519 11.4 4 4 9.298 17.335 15.699 13.28 13.408 
Min -22.297 -22.64 -22.915 -18.194 -19.29 -21.405 -22.212 -24.492 -19.925 -14.214 
StDev 1.3708 1.1529 1.1926 1.3288 1.0279 1.1992 1.3908 1.5751 1.2032 0.9076 
Skew -0.733 -0.7819 -0.7363 -0.3729 -0.6834 -0.758 -0.5516 -0.2298 -0.31 -0.2594 
Kurt 18.791 21.054 21.155 22.681 20.6 17.976 18.583 13.233 18.096 22.674 
J-B 114818 149914 151447 177070 142257 103428 111413 47902 104207 176815 
(0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
MV 244,032 405,110 871,743 1,165,593 1,020,932 672,003 591,237 1,014,340 284,455 261,923 
Obs 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 
Panel B: Correlations 
BM CG CS F HC I OG T TC U 
Basic Materials 1.00 
Consumer Goods 0.72 1.00 
Consumer Services 0.76 0.80 1.00 
Financials 0.73 0.68 0.79 1.00 
Health Care 0.69 0.70 0.79 0.71 1.00 
Industrials 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.81 0.77 1.00 
Oil & Gas 0.69 0.54 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.63 1.00 
Technology 0.62 0.66 0.76 0.64 0.62 0.76 0.48 1.00 
Telecommunications 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.47 0.59 1.00 
Utilities 0.60 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.44 0.57 1.00 
Notes : Panel A summarizes the descriptive statistics (mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and the Jarque- 
Bera statistic) of continuously compounded day-to-day percentage returns on 10 stock market sectors in the United States. BM = Basic Materials, CG = 
Consumer Goods, CS = Consumer Services, F = Financials, HC = Health Care, I = Industrials, OG = Oil & Gas, T = Technology, TC = Telecommunications, 
U = Utilities. Market value (MV) is displayed in million units of local currency (i.e., US$). Panel B reports the correlation between sectoral stock market 
returns. Data are from DGEI and run from 01/01/1973 to 12/31/2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We test the null hypothesis – for each sector – using the following regression model: 8 
R s t = δ0 + 
2 ∑ 
i =1 
δ1 ,i R 
s 
t−i + 
4 ∑ 
i =1 
δ2 ,i D i,t + δ3 T t + δ4 P t + δ5 HB t + δ6 H t + δ7 E t + 
2 ∑ 
i =1 
δ8 ,i J i,t + u t (1)
where R s t is the daily return of sector s; δ0 is a constant; R 
s 
t−i is the previous ith day rate of return. D i, t , with i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
are dummy variables for the days of the week from Monday to Thursday, T t is a dummy variable for the ﬁrst ﬁve days of
the taxation year, P t is a dummy variable capturing the annual event period, HB t is the home bias dummy taking a value of
one if the US soccer team wins a match and zero otherwise, H t is a dummy variable for days after non-weekend holidays,
and E t stands for event days. In addition, J i, t , with i = 1 , 2 are dummy variables for the 10 days with the lowest ( i = 1) and
highest ( i = 2) returns in our sample. Finally, u t is the error term. 
4. Regression Results 
To study the relationship between stock returns and sport sentiment we follow the procedure illustrated by Kaplanski
and Levy (2010a ). First, we estimate Eq. (1) using an OLS regression ( Tables 2 ). To address potential heteroskedasticity issues
we repeat the test assuming that the variance of the error term follows a GARCH (1,1) process. By inspection of Table 2 we
observe that the EED dummy variable has a negative effect on stock returns. The behavioral argument for this result is the
following: investors enter a state of bad mood on the day after the team they support loses a match and they decide to sell
stocks, thus, inducing stock returns to decrease. However, this effect is signiﬁcant only for the Financials and the Telecom-
munications sectors. 9 The sentiment effect is even more evident when we control for heteroskedasticity. From Figure 1 we
observe that the p-value for the signiﬁcance test of the sentiment coeﬃcient ( δ7 ) is close to zero for all models applied to
the Financials sector. For the Consumption Goods sector and the Telecommunications sector the p-value is close to zero only
for some regression speciﬁcations but is relatively large for other speciﬁcations. For other sectors the sentiment coeﬃcient
is not signiﬁcant supporting our claim that those sectors are not affected by sport sentiment. 10 8 A similar methodology can be found in Kamstra et al. (2003) and Edmans et al. (2007) . 
9 The use of the EPED dummy gives rise to similar results. Detailed results available in the Supplementary Appendix. 
10 Note that the scale of the y axis is inverted so that high p-values are plotted at the bottom of the Figure and low p-values at the top. 
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Table 2 
Regression Results (ALL SECTORS). 
Eqs δ0 δ1, 1 δ1, 2 δ2, 1 δ2, 2 δ2, 3 δ2, 4 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8, 1 δ8, 2 LogL 
R s t−1 R 
s 
t−2 D 1, t D 2, t D 3, t D 4, t T t P t HB t H t E t J 1, t J 2, t 
Basic Materials 
Coeff 0.0641 ∗ 0.0456 ∗∗ 0.0181 -0.1013 ∗∗ -0.0092 0.0037 -0.0299 0.1985 ∗ -0.0107 0.8466 -0.0092 -0.1185 -12.1333 ∗∗ 9.4097 ∗∗ -18304.64 
Signif (0.0157) (0.0040) (0.2190) (0.0078) (0.8085) (0.9217) (0.4290) (0.0394) (0.7408) (0.1185) (0.9037) (0.1492) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Consumer Goods 
Coeff 0.0054 0.0355 ∗ -0.0 0 09 0.0242 0.0286 0.0516 0.0177 0.2300 ∗∗ -0.0079 0.8266 0.0447 -0.1048 -8.8989 ∗∗ 6.7082 ∗∗ -16594.40 
Signif (0.8176) (0.0233) (0.9459) (0.4698) (0.3794) (0.1096) (0.5899) (0.0067) (0.7698) (0.1974) (0.4791) (0.1106) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Consumer Services 
Coeff 0.0502 ∗ 0.0692 ∗∗ -0.0143 -0.0679 ∗ 0.0038 0.0147 0.0061 0.0477 -0.0225 0.7297 -0.0195 -0.1085 -9.6109 ∗∗ 7.3859 ∗∗ -16887.19 
Signif (0.0325) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.2933) (0.0413) (0.9104) (0.6547) (0.8573) (0.5457) (0.4224) (0.1678) (0.7637) (0.1269) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Financials 
Coeff 0.0711 ∗∗ -0.0019 0.0152 -0.1138 ∗∗ -0.0023 -0.0110 -0.0185 0.1032 0.0030 1.0409 -0.0450 -0.1806 ∗ -12.4538 ∗∗ 11.1080 ∗∗ -17791.79 
Signif (0.0056) (0.9293) (0.4907) (0.0018) (0.9496) (0.7551) (0.6110) (0.2323) (0.9208) (0.1479) (0.5222) (0.0143) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Health-Care 
Coeff 0.0315 0.0658 ∗∗ -0.0252 -0.0140 0.0670 ∗ 0.0343 0.0024 -0.0609 -0.0134 0.3660 -0.0476 -0.0287 -8.1363 ∗∗ 6.6788 ∗∗ -15246.28 
Signif (0.1305) (0.0 0 01) (0.0596) (0.6314) (0.0221) (0.2323) (0.9329) (0.4008) (0.5868) (0.4410) (0.4170) (0.6621) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Industrials 
Coeff 0.0517 ∗ 0.0571 ∗∗ -0.0031 -0.0564 0.0164 -0.0 0 07 0.0019 0.0544 -0.0202 0.7922 -0.0 0 02 -0.0781 -9.4746 ∗∗ 7.4070 ∗∗ -16980.64 
Signif (0.0320) (0.0 0 02) (0.8287) (0.0956) (0.6309) (0.9839) (0.9566) (0.5302) (0.4728) (0.1075) (0.9975) (0.2816) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Oil&Gas 
Coeff 0.0952 ∗∗ 0.0086 -0.0325 ∗ -0.0981 ∗ -0.0363 -0.0199 -0.0754 ∗ 0.0575 -0.0126 0.2524 0.0115 -0.1443 -12.1076 ∗∗ 9.7633 ∗∗ -18467.26 
Signif (0.0 0 04) (0.5754) (0.0159) (0.0102) (0.3471) (0.6112) (0.0472) (0.5866) (0.7074) (0.6267) (0.8856) (0.0774) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Technology 
Coeff -0.0288 0.0127 -0.0220 0.0876 ∗ 0.0822 0.1144 ∗∗ 0.0329 0.1830 -0.0047 0.3707 0.0230 -0.1054 -10.7029 ∗∗ 10.3772 ∗∗ -20044.12 
Signif (0.3535) (0.3611) (0.1483) (0.0449) (0.0715) (0.0096) (0.4574) (0.1135) (0.9042) (0.6724) (0.8100) (0.2836) 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 
Telecommunications 
Coeff 0.0663 ∗∗ 0.0010 -0.0080 -0.0640 -0.0221 -0.0415 -0.0327 0.0584 0.0150 0.6503 0.0451 -0.1924 ∗ -8.9727 ∗∗ 9.0440 ∗∗ -16969.48 
Signif (0.0052) (0.9480) (0.6197) (0.0573) (0.5183) (0.2160) (0.3256) (0.5098) (0.5857) (0.1224) (0.4979) (0.0118) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Utilities 
Coeff 0.0813 ∗∗ 0.0596 ∗∗ 0.0148 -0.0588 ∗ -0.0638 ∗ -0.0540 ∗ -0.0515 ∗ 0.0753 -0.0047 -0.3247 -0.0268 -0.0531 -7.6080 ∗∗ 8.1624 ∗∗ -13646.12 
Signif (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0020) (0.3491) (0.0188) (0.0111) (0.0293) (0.0391) (0.3038) (0.8325) (0.4899) (0.5784) (0.3519) (0.0 0 0 0) (0.0 0 0 0) 
Note : This table reports the results of the regression Eq. (1) . Results of multiple linear regression models of continuously compounded day-to-day percentage returns on sectoral portfolios of Basic Mate- 
rials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Healthcare, Industrials, Oil&Gas, Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities. The estimated equations are in rows, and the estimated coeﬃcients 
are in columns. R s t is the daily return of sector s, δ0 is a constant, R 
s 
t−i is the previous ith day rate of return. D i, t , with i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , are dummy variables for the day of the week (i.e. Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday, and Thursday, respectively), T t is a dummy variable for the ﬁrst ﬁve days of the taxation year, P t is a dummy variable capturing the annual event period, HB t is a dummy capturing a potential 
home bias effect in case of wins by the US soccer team, H t is a dummy variable for days after non-weekend holidays, and E t stands for event days (EED). In addition, J i, t , with i = 1 , 2 are dummy variables 
for the 10 days with the lowest ( i = 1 ) and highest ( i = 2 ) returns during the analyzed period. Finally, u t is the error term. The log-likelihood value of the estimated model is shown in the last column. 
The standard error estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity. We use daily data for the period January 1973 – December 2014 (a total of 10,958 observations). P-values are reported in parentheses. ∗ and 
∗∗ indicate a signiﬁcance level of 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Fig. 1. Regression results. Notes: This Figure reports the p-values associated to the sentiment coeﬃcient, δ7 , obtained from twelve different regression 
speciﬁcations for each sector. Estimates for all the other coeﬃcients are reported in the Supplementary Appendix. Spec. 1: linear model with event effect 
days only; Spec. 2: GARCH model with event effect days only; Spec. 3: linear model without serial correlation and event effect days; Spec. 4: GARCH model 
without serial correlation and event effect days; Spec. 5: Linear model with serial correlation and event effect days; Spec 6: GARCH model with serial 
correlation and event effect days; Spec. 7: linear model with event period effect days only; Spec. 8 : GARCH model with event period effect days only; 
Spec. 9: linear model without serial correlation and event period effect days; Spec 10: GARCH model without serial correlation and event period effect 
days; Spec. 11: linear model with serial correlation and event period effect days; Spec. 12: GARCH model with serial correlation and event period effect 
days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We then turn to the relationship between sport sentiment and liquidity. 11 Entries in Table 3 suggest that the Financials
sector has the second highest level of liquidity as measured by annual turnover by volume and average turnover by vol-
ume. 12 This suggests that sport sentiment affects liquid sectors more than illiquid sectors. After all, if investors enter a state
of bad mood on the day after a match, it is reasonable to believe they may not want to sell stocks at a low price and, for
this reason, they prefer to stay away from illiquid markets. 
We also estimate the multiple linear regression model that features the EED dummy for the last two World Cups (2010
and 2014). The eﬃcient market hypothesis suggests that the stock market behavior should diminish the scope of proﬁtable
trading strategies over time ( Kaplanski and Levy (2014) ). Indeed, for the Financials sector, the EED dummy does not exert
a signiﬁcant effect on stock returns. This ﬁnding agrees with Kaplanski and Levy (2014) who report similar results for the
2010 World Cup. To test whether the relationship between sport sentiment and stock returns depends on the US being the
hosting country or not, we repeat the analysis by focusing only on the 1994 World Cup. For this particular year we ﬁnd
weaker evidence of the sentiment effect. 13 Finally, for the sake of completeness we repeat the analysis for Germany, Italy
and the UK. We ﬁnd evidence of a sport sentiment effect for sectors different than Financials. For the UK the relevant sector
is Oil & Gas, for Germany Healthcare and Telecommunications while for Italy the relevant sectors are Consumer Services
and Health Care. This result is in line with the main hypothesis that sport sentiment in the US market is mainly driven
by foreign investors (also because soccer is not very popular among local investors in the US). 14 Instead, European markets
have a lower fraction of foreign investors and, at the same time, soccer is very popular among local investors. For these11 A body of literature on behavioral ﬁnance is persuasive of the relation between investor sentiment and stock market liquidity. In this regard, Tetlock 
(2007) ﬁnds that (i) unusually high or low levels of investor pessimism predict high market trading volume and (ii) high levels of media pessimism predict 
downward pressure on market prices. 
12 If one excludes the Dot.Com period (i.e.,1997-20 0 0) the Financials sector becomes the most liquid sector in our sample. 
13 This could be due to the fact that hosting the World Cup stimulates aggregate investment that has a positive effect on the aggregate stock market, thus 
neutralizing (partially) the negative sport sentiment effect. Detailed results available in the Supplementary Appendix. 
14 See Kaplanski and Levy (2010a ) for a detailed discussion of these arguments. Detailed results available in the Supplementary Appendix. 
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Table 3 
Summary table. 
End-of-period Ann. out-PRFM Sharpe Ann. Turnover Avg Turnover 
Portfolio out-PRFM value over Ratio by by Volume 
of 100 USD Benchmark (%) Volume Growth (%) over Market Value 
Basic Materials 266.1 0.336 2.79 2.1 0.13 
Consumer Goods 487.1 0.422 3.42 3.4 0.12 
Consumer Services 594.3 0.422 3.5 4.1 0.14 
Financials 1201.7 0.796 3.36 5.5 0.14 
Health Care -152.1 -0.045 4.62 2.7 0.08 
Industrials 451.8 0.241 3.68 3.3 0.09 
Oil & Gas 487.9 0.34 3.18 4.3 0.08 
Technology 138.3 0.209 2.49 6.6 0.22 
Telecommunications 626 0.613 3.24 4.2 0.14 
Utilities 172.3 0.091 4.49 1.5 0.11 
NYSE Composite 181.4 0.361 2.9 
S&P500 173.8 0.355 2.81 
Notes : This table summarizes the performance of sell-and-hold trading strategies for the Basic Materials, Consumer 
Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, Utilities, 
NYSE Composite and S&P500 stock indices. Annualized percentage end-of-period outperformance and Sharpe ratio are 
used to evaluate the performance of trading strategies. The end-of-period outperformance value of a given trading strat- 
egy is the difference between the sell-and-hold strategy for each portfolio and and its respective long-only benchmark 
investment of 100 USD. The Sharpe-Ratio is deﬁned as the mean return of the sell-and-hold strategy over its standard 
deviation. A 0.5% transaction cost for getting in or out of the market is included. The last two columns report two 
liquidity measures. Annualized turnover by volume growth reports the annualized growth rate of turnover by volume 
for each long-only benchmark portfolio. The last column presents turnover by volume divided by market capitalization 
averaged over the sample period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 reasons, sport sentiment may affect different investors (i.e., local investors) and, thus, different sectors such as Oil & Gas. 15 
A possible future research topic would be to understand the salient characteristic that makes those sectors compatible with
the sport sentiment of local investors in Europe. 
5. Exploiting Cross-Sector World Cup Effects 
Based on the empirical evidence reported in the previous section we seek to build a proﬁtable trading strategy. We
assume that an investor who invests in a particular sector is willing to reallocate her wealth to the 3 month T-Bill during
a World Cup period (i.e., underweight the sector). Differently, when no World Cup is taking place, the investor keeps her
wealth invested in the sector portfolio. Figure 2 (panel A) depicts the cumulative outperformance of this trading strategy
over its respective benchmark portfolio (i.e., a long-only position in a particular sector over a period from 01.01.1974 to
31.12.2014). Following Kaplanski and Levy (2010a ), we assume transaction costs of 0.5%. For illustration purposes we report
only Financials, the average across the remaining nine sectors, the NYSE Composite and the S&P 500. However, on a sector-
by-sector comparison Financials still exhibit the highest cumulative outperformance. Panel B depicts the cumulative return
of each sector averaged across all World Cup games taken place between 1974 and 2014. 16 Finally, in Panel C we report the
average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the ﬁrst match day for the Financials sector and the average across all
remaining sectors. 
These three performance indicators clearly depict that underweighting the Financials sector during the World Cup games
leads to superior returns as opposed to a simple long-only strategy in the same sector. 17 When considering the whole US
market, as proxied by NYSE Composite and S&P 500, the underweighting strategy yields a positive overall cumulative return,
but smaller than the return obtained by using the strategy based on the Financials sector only. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Does investor sentiment spread evenly across different industrial sectors? In this paper we use international soccer re-
sults to study the effect of investors’ sentiment on US industrial sectors. We ﬁnd that sport sentiment affects mainly the
Financials sector but not other sectors. Based on this result, we develop a simple and proﬁtable trading strategy to exploit
the sectoral sentiment effect. We argue that the sectoral effect of investor sentiment depends on the kind of sentiment under
analysis. In this paper, we consider sport sentiment that, as argued in the previous literature, is more likely to affect for-
eign investors than local investors in the US. As a result, the relationship between sport sentiment and the Financials sector15 This is also in line with the result of Edmans et al. (2007) . 
16 Since the length of the eleven World Cup periods varies from 20 to 26 days, we depict the average strategy performance for the ﬁrst 20 days. 
17 Note that even after the Financial crisis in 2008 the underweighting strategy is most proﬁtable among all sectors and yields an annualized outperfor- 
mance of 0.796%. 
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Fig. 2. Exploiting the World Cup Effect. Notes: Panel A depicts the cumulative outperformance of the Financials sector in excess of its benchmark portfolio. 
The Financials trading portfolio invests 100% in the Financials sector during non-World Cup days but reduces its exposure during World Cup periods. During 
the World Cup, it has a 0% exposure to the Financials sector and 100% exposure to the 3m T-Bills. The benchmark portfolio for Financials, is the sector 
itself, i.e. 100% Financials over the whole period from 01.01.1974 - 31.12.2014. The outperformance is the difference between the Financials trading portfolio 
and the Financials benchmark portfolio. The same strategy is applied to all other sectors, the NYSE Composite Index and the S&P500. The cumulative 
outperformance is averaged across sectors excluding Financials. Transaction costs of 0.5% for getting in or out of the market are included. Panel B depicts 
the average cumulative performance of the ten sectors and the benchmark indices S&P 500 and NYSE Composite. The investment strategy is a simple 
short position taken in a sector or benchmark portfolio at the beginning of a World Cup period and held until its end. The length of the eleven World 
Cup periods under consideration varies from 20 to 26 days. This ﬁgure depicts the average strategy performance during the ﬁrst 20 days. Panel C depicts 
the average cumulative residuals around the ﬁrst matchday ( t = 0 ) for the Financials sector (red line) and the average across the remaining nine sectors 
(blue-diamond line). The residual on day t is calculated as the difference between observed rate of return and the ex-post expected rate of return on day 
t . The one-factor capital asset pricing model r t = α + βr m,t + t , where r t is the sector return and r m, t is the S&P 500 return, is estimated using a 252-day 
estimation window. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 might be due to the relatively high liquidity that makes the Financials sector more attractive to foreign investors. However,
we believe that different kinds of investor sentiment (for instance, those based on meteorological conditions, seasonal dis-
eases, temperature or lunar phases) might affect the behavior of other types of investors (for instance, local investors in the
US) and, thus, might have a more pronounced effect on sectors (or stocks) other than Financials. This topic is left for future
research. 
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